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STICKY PRICE MODELS OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE: CAN
THE CONTRACT MULTIPLIER SOLVE THE
PERSISTENCE PROBLEM?
BY V. V. CHARI, PATRICK J. KEHOE, AND ELLEN R. MCGRATTAN1
We construct a quantitative equilibrium model with firms setting prices in a staggered
fashion and use it to ask whether monetary shocks can generate business cycle fluctua-
tions. These fluctuations include persistent movements in output along with the other
defining features of business cycles, like volatile investment and smooth consumption. We
assume that prices are exogenously sticky for a short time. Persistent output fluctuations
require endogenous price stickiness in the sense that firms choose not to change prices
much when they can do so. We find that for a wide range of parameter values, the amount
of endogenous stickiness is small. Thus, we find that in a standard quantitative model,
staggered price-setting, alone, does not generate business cycle fluctuations.
KEYWORDS: Staggered price-setting, endogenous price stickiness, monetary business
cycles.
1. INTRODUCTION
SINCE THE EARLY 1970s, macroeconomists have known how to construct general
equilibrium models in which monetary shocks generate contemporaneous out-
Ž Žput fluctuations. Examples of such models include the work of Lucas 1972,
. Ž . Ž .1990 , Fischer 1977 , Phelps and Taylor 1977 , and Lucas and Woodford
Ž . .1993 . The more difficult problem is to construct models in which monetary
shocks generate the main feature of business cycles: persistent movements in
output. In a large class of models, generating such persistence requires that
prices not change much for a long time after monetary shocks. An unappealing
way of generating persistence is to simply assume that prices are exogenously
fixed for long periods of time. A preferable way is to construct models in which
small frictions lead to long periods of endogenous price rigidity and, hence,
persistent output movements.
Staggered price-setting provides a promising mechanism to generate long
periods of endogenous price stickiness with the small frictions of short periods
Ž .of exogenous price stickiness. Taylor 1980, p. 2 provides an eloquent exposition
of this mechanism:
Because of the staggering, some firms will have established their wage rates prior to the
current negotiations, but others will establish their wage rates in future periods. Hence,
when considering relative wages, firms and unions must look both forward and backward
1 We thank Susanto Basu, Miles Kimball, Julio Rotemberg, Michael Woodford, and especially a
co-editor for helpful comments. Chari thanks the NSF for financial support. Kehoe thanks the NSF
and the Ronald S. Lauder Foundation for financial support. Materials related to this paper are
available at http:minneapolisfed.orgresearchsrsr217.html. The views expressed herein are
those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the
Federal Reserve System.
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in time to see what other workers will be paid during their own contract period. In effect,
each contract is written relative to other contracts, and this causes shocks to be passed on
from one contract to anothera sort of ‘‘contract multiplier.’’
Thus, the idea is that staggered price-setting leads to interactions among
price-setters that generate longer movements in output than does a similar
Ž . Ž .model with synchronized price-setting. Taylor 1980 and Blanchard 1991
investigate this mechanism for generating persistent output fluctuations, but
both exogenously specify the rules for setting wages or prices.
Here we study a quantitative general equilibrium model with rational price-
setting firms and staggered price-setting and ask if the model can generate a
monetary business cycle. In particular, we use a variant of a standard sticky price
model in which imperfectly competitive firms set nominal prices and real money
balances enter the consumer’s utility function.2 To this setup we add time,
uncertainty, and capital accumulation, as well as staggered price-setting. We ask
whether the model with a short period of exogenous price stickiness can
generate long periods of endogenous price stickiness and persistent output
fluctuations. Our main finding is that it cannot: staggered price-setting, by itself,
does not generate business cycles driven by monetary shocks.
We also find that the intertemporal links of capital accumulation and
interest-sensitive money demand play a central role in generating the persis-
tence problem. Specifically, we show that in versions of our model without
intertemporal links, staggered price-setting leads to persistent output fluctua-
tions after monetary shocks, but once such links are introduced, output fluctua-
tions are no longer persistent.
Our model has a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms that pro-
duce differentiated products using capital and labor. These firms set nominal
prices for a fixed number of periods and do so in a staggered fashion. In
particular, each period, 1N of the firms choose new prices, which are then
fixed for N periods. The consumer side of the model is standard. Consumers are
infinitely lived and have preferences over consumption, leisure, and real money
balances. The nominal money supply follows an exogenous stochastic process.
We measure the effect of staggered price-setting on the persistence of output
by the contract multiplier. This multiplier is the ratio of the half-life of output
deviations after a monetary shock with staggered price-setting to the corre-
sponding half-life with synchronized price setting. The half-life of output devia-
tions with synchronized price-setting is roughly one-half the length of exogenous
price stickiness. The half-life of output in the data is 10 quarters. Thus, if the
period of exogenous price stickiness is about one quarter, then the model with
2 Our setup draws on some of the work on earlier general equilibrium sticky price models,
Ž . Ž .including, for example, Blanchard and Kiyotaki 1987 and Ball and Romer 1989, 1990 . Our work is
also closely connected to some recent work embedding sticky prices in business cycle models; see
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Ohanian and Stockman 1994 , Cho and Cooley 1995 , King and Watson 1996 , Rotemberg 1996 ,
Ž . Ž .Woodford 1996 , and Yun 1996 . For a slightly different approach using fixed costs, see Caplin and
Ž . Ž .Spulber 1987 and Caplin and Leahy 1991 .
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staggered price-setting must produce a contract multiplier of about 20 in order
to match the data.
Our benchmark specification is the standard one in the business cycle litera-
ture. The utility function has unit elasticity of substitution between consumption
and leisure and is thus consistent with balanced growth. Our specification of
demand for intermediate goods has constant elasticity, as in the work of Dixit
Ž .and Stiglitz 1977 . Our technology has constant returns to scale. When we
calibrate the model, we find that the contract multiplier is roughly 1. Thus, for
our benchmark specification, the staggered price-setting mechanism does not
generate persistence.
In order to gain some intuition for these results, we see what happens when
we eliminate capital and impose a static money demand equation. The lin-
earized version of this model consists of two equations, a static money demand
equation and a price-setting equation, that are essentially identical to those used
Ž .by Taylor 1980 . The only difference between Taylor’s equations and ours
Ž .besides his wages being relabeled as our prices is that in Taylor’s formulation
the coefficient on the sum of future output in the price-setting equation is a free
parameter, while in ours it is a function of the parameters of the underlying
economy. For the model to generate a persistent output response to a monetary
shock, this coefficient must be small, so that monetary shocks do not induce
firms to raise their prices much. In our model, this coefficient is the product of
two parameters: the sensitivity of prices to costs and the sensitivity of costs to
output. With constant elasticity of demand, prices move one-for-one with costs.
With unit elasticity of substitution in preferences, costs are extremely sensitive
to output. Thus, in our model, the coefficient on the sum of future output is
large, and monetary shocks do not have persistent effects on output.
We examine three ways of possibly increasing the persistence of output
movements. One is to make consumption and leisure close to perfect substitutes
in preferences, so that costs are less sensitive to output. With such preferences,
the contract multiplier is 20 without intertemporal links but less than 1 with
such links. Thus, while eliminating the intertemporal links of capital accumula-
tion and interest-sensitive money demand makes developing analytical expres-
sions easy, this procedure can be misleading. We also find that both with and
without intertemporal links, prices change hardly at all after a monetary shock,
but with intertemporal links, output is not persistent. This finding shows that
endogenous price stickiness, by itself, does not necessarily imply persistent
output fluctuations.
Ž .Another mechanism we explore, suggested by Kimball 1995 , is designed to
make prices less sensitive to cost changes. If intermediate goods producers face
an elasticity of demand that rises as their relative prices rise, so that demand is
convex, then these producers may optimally choose not to raise their prices
much after a monetary shock that raises output and costs. We show that
generating persistence from this feature requires extraordinarily convex demand
functions for intermediate goods.
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A third potentially helpful mechanism has been suggested by Rotemberg
Ž .1996 . He suggests that persistence can be increased if firms face upward-slop-
ing marginal cost curves, as they do if they use specific factors that are
inelastically supplied. Adding specific factors makes costs and prices less sensi-
tive to wage changes. Indeed, with specific factors and with extremely elastic
demand, large contract multipliers can be obtained in the model without
intertemporal links. But here, too, adding intertemporal links reduces the
contract multiplier significantly.
Finally, we consider a model with combinations of all the variations we have
explored. We find that the contract multiplier is approximately 2. Thus, to get
the kind of persistence seen in the data, the exogenous price stickiness needs to
1last roughly 2 years.2
2. A BENCHMARK MONETARY ECONOMY
Consider a monetary economy populated by a large number of identical,
infinitely lived consumers. In each period t, the economy experiences one of
t Ž .finitely many events s . We denote by s  s , . . . , s the history of events upt 0 t
through and including period t. The probability, as of period 0, of any particular
t Ž t.history s is  s . The initial realization s is given.0
In each period t, the commodities in this economy are labor, a consumption-
 capital good, money, and a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by i 0, 1 .
The technology for producing final goods from intermediate goods at history
s t is
1
t tŽ . Ž . Ž .1 y s  y i , s di ,H
Ž t. Ž t.where y s is the final good, y i, s is an intermediate good of type i, and the
Ž .elasticity of substitution between goods is 1 1 . The technology for produc-
ing each intermediate good i is a standard constant returns to scale production
function:
Ž . Ž t . Ž Ž t . Ž t ..2 y i , s F k i , s , l i , s ,
Ž t. Ž t.where k i, s and l i, s are the inputs of capital and labor.
Final goods producers behave competitively. In each period t, they choose
Ž t.   Ž t.inputs y i, s for all i 0, 1 and output y s to maximize profits given by
t t t1 tŽ . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .3 max P s y s  P i , s y i , s di ,H
tŽ . Ž .subject to 1 , where P s is the price of the final good in period t and
Ž t1.P i, s is the price of intermediate good i in period t. The intermediate goods
prices do not depend on s because period t prices in our economy are sett
Ž .before the realization of the period t shocks. Solving the problem in 3 gives the
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input demand functions:
Ž .1 1tŽ .P s
d t tŽ . Ž . Ž .4 y i , s  y s .t1Ž .P i , s
The zero-profit condition implies that
Ž .1 
Ž . 1t t1Ž . Ž . Ž .5 P s  P i , s di .H
Notice that in equilibrium the output price in period t depends on only s t1.
Intermediate goods producers behave as imperfect competitors. They set
prices for N periods and do so in a staggered fashion. In particular, in each
Ž t1.period t, a fraction 1N of these producers choose new prices P i, s before
the realization of the event s . These prices are set for N periods, so for thist
Ž tr1. Ž t1.group of intermediate goods producers, P i, s P i, s for 0, . . . , N
1. The intermediate goods producers are indexed so that producers indexed
 i 0, 1N set new prices in 0, N, 2N, and so on, while producers indexed
 i 1N, 2N set new prices in 1, N1, 2N1, and so on, for the N cohorts
of intermediate goods producers. In period t, each producer in a cohort chooses
Ž t1.prices P i, s to maximize discounted profits from period t to period tN
1. That is, each solves this problem:
tN1
 t1 t1   d Ž . Ž .  Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .6 max Q s s P i , s  s P s y i , s ,Ý Ý
t1 Ž .P i , s t s
Ž  t1.  t1 Ž t.where Q s s is the price of one dollar in s in units of dollars at s ,  s
t dŽ t. Ž .is the unit cost of production at s , and y i, s is given in 4 . The unit cost of
production is given by
Ž . Ž t . Ž t . Ž t .7  s min r s kw s l
k , l
Ž . Ž t. Ž t.subject to F k, l 	1, where r s is the rental rate on capital and w s is the
Ž .real wage rate. The solution to the problem stated in 6 is
Ž . Ž .2  1tN1  t1   Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Ý Ý Q s s P s  s y st st1Ž . Ž .8 P i , s  .Ž .1 1tN1  t1  Ž . Ž . Ž .Ý Ý Q s s P s y st s
Implicit in this problem are the demands for capital and labor by the intermedi-
Žate goods producers. Note that these factor demands are the unit factor
Ž .demands, which solve 7 , multiplied by the level of output of the intermediate
. Ž t. Ž t.good producer. These factor demands, k i, s and l i, s , of producer i in
period t are made after the realization of the event s and thus depend on s t.t
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Cost minimization implies that
Ž Ž t . Ž t .. Ž t .F k i , s , l i , s w slŽ .9  .tt t Ž .Ž Ž . Ž .. r sF k i , s , l i , sk
Given constant returns to scale, this implies that capital-labor ratios are equated
 across the intermediate goods firms, so for all i 0, 1 ,
Ž t . Ž t .k i , s k 0, s
Ž .10  .t tŽ . Ž .l i , s l 0, s
In what follows, each intermediate goods firm has the Cobb-Douglas production
Ž Ž t. Ž t.. Ž t. Ž t.1function, F k i, s , l i, s k i, s l i, s , where  is the share of capital
Ž .in costs. Thus 9 can be written as
Ž t . Ž t .1 k i , s w s
Ž .11  .t tž / Ž . Ž . l i , s r s
Consumer preferences are given by

t t t t t tŽ . Ž . Ž Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž ..12   s U c s , l s , M s P s ,Ý Ý
tt0 s
Ž t. Ž t. Ž t.where 01 is the discount factor and where c s , l s , and M s are
consumption, labor, and nominal money balances, respectively. In each period
t0, 1, . . . , consumers choose their period t allocations after the realization of
the event s . The problem of consumers is to choose rules for consumptiont
Ž t. Ž t. Ž t. Ž t.c s , labor l s , capital stocks k s , nominal money balances M s , and
Ž t1. Ž .one-period nominal bonds B s to maximize 12 subject to the sequence of
budget constraints
t t t t t1 t t1Ž .Ž Ž . Ž .. Ž . Ž . Ž .P s c s k s M s  Q s s B sÝ
st1
t t t t t1Ž .Ž Ž . Ž .  Ž .  Ž ..
P s w s l s  r s 1	 k s
Ž t1 . Ž t . Ž t . Ž t . Ž .M s B s 
 s T s t0, 1, . . .
t1Ž .and borrowing constraints B s 	B for some large negative number B. Here
Ž t. Ž t.
 s is the nominal profits of the intermediate goods producers, T s is
nominal transfers, and 	 is the depreciation rate of capital. The initial condi-
Ž 1 . Ž 1 . Ž 0. Ž t1.tions k s , M s , and B s are given. Each of the nominal bonds B s
t1 Ž t1 t. tis a claim to one dollar in state s and costs Q s s dollars in state s . In
terms of relating the prices in the intermediate goods producers’ problem to
Ž  t. Ž t1 t. Ž t2 t1. Ž  1.these prices, note that Q s s Q s s Q s s  Q s s for all
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 t. The first-order conditions for the consumer can be written as
Ž t .U sl tŽ . Ž .13  w s ,tŽ .U sc
Ž t . Ž t . Ž t1 .U s U s U sc m ct1 tŽ . Ž .14    s s ,Ýt t t1Ž . Ž . Ž .P s P s P sst1
Ž . Ž t . Ž t1 t . Ž t1 .  Ž t1 . 15 U s   s s U s r s 1	 ,Ýc c
st1
 tŽ . Ž .U s P sc t t  tŽ . Ž . Ž .16 Q s s   s s t Ž . Ž .U s P sc
Ž t. Ž t. Ž t.for all  t, where U s , U s , and U s denote the derivatives of the utilityc l m
Ž  t. Ž  . Ž t.function with respect to its arguments and  s s  s  s is the condi-
tional probability of s given s t.
Ž t. Ž t. Ž t1.The nominal money supply process is given by M s  s M s , where
Ž t. s is a stochastic process. New money balances are distributed to consumers
Ž t. Ž t.in a lump-sum fashion by having nominal transfers satisfy T s M s 
Ž t1.M s .
In terms of market-clearing conditions, consider first the factor markets.
Notice that the capital stock chosen by consumers in period t1 for rental in
Ž t1. Ž t.period t is k s while the labor supply in period t is l s . In turn, each
intermediate goods producer i chooses factor demands after the realization of
Ž t.uncertainty s in period t, so the demands for capital and labor are k i, s andt
Ž t.l i, s . Factor market-clearing thus requires that
Ž . Ž t1 . Ž t .17 k s  k i , s di ,H
Ž . Ž t . Ž t .18 l s  l i , s di.H
Ž t1.Bond market-clearing requires that B s 0. The resource constraint for this
economy is
Ž . Ž t . Ž t . Ž t . Ž . Ž t1 .19 c s k s y s  1	 k s .
An equilibrium for this economy is, then, a collection of allocations for
Ž t. Ž t. Ž t1. Ž t. Ž t1.consumers c s , l s , k s , M s , B s ; allocations for intermediate
Ž t. Ž t.  goods producers k i, s , l i, s for i 0, 1 ; allocations for final goods produc-
Ž t. Ž t.   Ž t. Ž t. Ž  t.ers y s and y i, s for i 0, 1 ; together with prices w s , r s ,Q s s for
t t1Ž . Ž .   t, . . . , tN1, P s , and P i, s for i 0, 1 that satisfy the following
Ž .conditions: i taking prices as given, consumer allocations solve the consumer’s
Ž .problem; ii taking all prices but his own as given, each intermediate goods
Ž . Ž .producer’s price solves 6 ; iii taking the prices as given, the final goods
Ž .producer’s allocations solve the final goods producer’s problem; iv the factor
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Ž . Ž . Ž .market conditions 17 and 18 and the resource constraint 19 hold, and the
bond market clears.
3. COMPUTATION OF EQUILIBRIUM
Now we briefly describe how we compute an equilibrium in the benchmark
economy. We begin by substituting out a number of variables and reducing the
equilibrium to four equations: the resource constraint, a pricing equation, an
Euler equation for money, and an Euler equation for capital. Once we have
these four equations, we compute Markov equilibria in which allocations are
functions of the state of the economy. The state variables are lagged prices, the
capital stock, and money shocks. The decision variables are current prices,
consumption, labor, and investment. In what follows, we will be focusing on the
symmetric equilibrium in which all the intermediate goods producers of the
Ž t. Ž t. Ž t. Ž t.same cohort make identical decisions. Thus, P i, s P j, s , k i, s k j, s ,
Ž t. Ž t. Ž t. Ž t.  l i, s  l j, s , y i, s y j, s for all i, j 0, 1N , and so on, for the N
cohorts.
We begin with the resource constraint. Equating supplies of and demands for
Ž . Ž .each intermediate good using equations 2 and 4 and integrating gives
Ž . Ž .1 1 1 1t t1 tŽ . Ž . Ž .P s P i , s di y sHž /
Ž Ž t1 . Ž t . . Ž t .F k s l s , 1 l i , s di ,Hž /
where we have exploited the facts that F is a constant returns to scale
production function and that capital-labor ratios are equated across producers,
Ž . Ž .as in 10 . Simplifying using 18 gives
Ž .1 1tŽ .P s
t t1 tŽ . Ž . Ž Ž . Ž ..20 y s F k s , l s .Ž .1 1t1ž /Ž .HP i , s di
Ž . Ž .Substituting 20 into 19 gives the resource constraint we use in our computa-
tions.
We can now develop the pricing equation. We first express unit cost in terms
Ž .of the aggregate allocations. To do so, we solve the minimization problem in 7
Ž . Ž .and use 10 and 13 to get
t tŽ . Ž .1 U s l sltŽ . Ž .21  s  .t t1ž /Ž . Ž .1 U s k sc
Since all prices are equal, within each cohort of producers, we need only record
one price per cohort and not the index identifying the producers. Thus, from
Ž t1.now on, we drop the dependence on i, and we let P s denote the prices set
Ž t2 .at the beginning of period t, P s denote the prices set at the beginning of
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Ž .period t1, and so on. Using 5 , we can write the aggregate price level as
Ž .1 Ž . Ž . 1  11 1t t1 tNŽ . Ž . Ž . Ž .22 P s  P s   P s .N N
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Using 16 , 20 , 21 , and 22 in 8 , we obtain the pricing equation we use in
our computations.
Ž . Ž .Finally, we rewrite the Euler equations for money and capital, 14 and 15 ,
tŽ . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .using 22 to substitute for P s and using 10 , 11 , and 13 to substitute
Ž t.for r s .
We are interested in a stationary equilibrium and thus restrict the stochastic
processes for the growth of the money supply to be Markov. A stationary
equilibrium for this economy consists of stationary decision rules that are
functions of the state of the economy. Because producers choose their prices
before the current money shock is realized, while other allocations are chosen
after the money shock is realized, in each period we must record two states for
the economy. The state for producers in period t must record the N1
intermediate goods prices in addition to the capital stock and lagged money
growth rates. The state for other allocations in period t, such as consumer
allocations and input allocations for producers, must record the state for
producers plus the current money growth rates. In any period t, N1 prices
prevail for intermediate goods, namely, those set at the beginning of period
Ž t2 . Ž t3.t1, P s ; those set at the beginning of period t2, P s ; and so
Ž . Ž tN .on, through those set in period t N1 , P s . We normalize prices
by dividing them by the money stock. Thus, the state for producers is
 Ž t2 . Ž t1. Ž tN . Ž t1. Ž t1. Ž t1.P s M s , . . . , P s M s , k s ,  s . The state for other
Ž t.allocations also includes  s . The decision variables for period t are aggregate
Ž t. Ž t.consumption in t, c s ; aggregate labor supply in t, l s ; and the normalized
price of the cohort of intermediate goods producers that are setting their prices
Ž t1. Ž t1.at the beginning of period t, P s M s .
In some of the models we consider, investment is extremely volatile. To
reduce that volatility, we introduce adjustment costs in changing the capital
stock employed by each intermediate goods producer. Specifically, the law of
motion for capital used in producing good i is given by
Ž t .x i , s
t t1 t1 tŽ . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .23 k i , s  1	 k i , s  k i , s x i , s ,t1ž /Ž .k i , s
where  is the adjustment cost function and x is investment. The problem of
monopolist i who chooses prices at date t, tN, t2N, and so on is to choose
Ž  . Ž  . Ž  . Ž  .P i, s , l i, s , x i, s , and k i, s for 	 t to maximize

 t1  d    Ž .  Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Q s s P i , s y i , s w s P s l i , sÝ Ý
t s
 Ž . Ž .P s x i , s
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TABLE I
MODEL PARAMETERS
Model Parameter Values
A. Benchmark Economy
TNPreferences 0.97 , 0.94, 0.39,
1.5, 1
Production 0.33, 0.9
TNCapital Accumulation 	10.92 , b adjusted
4TNMoney Growth 0.57
B. Three Variations
Near-Perfect Substitute Preferences 0.0002, 0.00011,
0.0002,  ,  adjusted1 2
Convex Demand 10, 289
Specific Factors  0.22,  0.441 2
Note: In our experiments, T 14 unless otherwise noted.
Ž . Ž . Ž t. Ž Ž t1. Ž t.. Ž  .subject to 4 , 23 , y i, s F k i, s , l i, s , and the constraints P i, s 
Ž t1. Ž  . Ž tN1.P i, s for  t, . . . , tN1, P i, s P i, s for  tN, . . . , t
2N1, and so on. Clearly, in computing an equilibrium for this economy, we
must record the capital stock employed by the representative producer in each
cohort, and we expand the state and decision variables accordingly. We also
modify the resource constraint appropriately. We then linearize the resulting
equations around the steady state and use standard methods to obtain linear
decision rules. When N1 and 2, we check the accuracy of the linear decision
rules against nonlinear decision rules obtained by the finite element method.
Ž Ž . .See the work of McGrattan 1996 .
4. CALIBRATION OF THE BENCHMARK ECONOMY
Now we describe how we chose the parameter values for the benchmark
economy that are summarized in panel A of Table I. Later, we will conduct a
wide range of sensitivity analyses, so we view this calibration as only setting the
midpoint of the ranges for each of the parameters. These ranges are set wide
enough to encompass most estimates of the various parameters in the literature.
Consider a utility function of the form
Ž . Ž .24 U c, l , MP
1Ž . 1Ž .1  Ž1. Ž .Ž . Ž .c  1 MP 1 lž /
 ,Ž .1
where  is the share parameter,  is interest elasticity,  is the weight on
leisure, and  is risk aversion. Utility functions of this form are attractive
Žbecause they are consistent with balanced growth. See the work of Cooley and
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Ž . .Prescott 1995 . But these functions have the unattractive feature that the share
of time devoted to the market is linked to the labor supply elasticity, which is
Ž .given by 1 l l. In Section 5, we consider preferences that do not have this
feature.
Ž .We chose parameter values for the utility function 24 as follows. For  and
, we drew on the money demand literature. Our model can be used to price a
variety of assets, including a nominal bond that costs one dollar at s t and pays a
Ž t. t1gross interest rate of R s dollars in all states s . The first-order condition for
Ž t. Ž t.Ž Ž t. . Ž t.this asset can be written as U s U s R s 1 R s . Using our specifi-m c
cation of utility, we can rewrite the first-order condition as
Ž t . Ž t .M s  R s 1
tŽ . Ž .25 log  log  log c s  log .tt ž /Ž .Ž . 1 R sP s
We regressed the log of consumption velocity on the interest rate variable in
Ž .25 using several data series from Citibase for 1960:11995:4: M1; the GDP
deflator; the consumption of services, nondurables, and durables; and the
three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate. The implied value of  from our regression
is 0.94. Our estimate of the interest elasticity is 0.39, with a standard error
of 0.033. This elasticity is similar to that estimated by Mankiw and Summers
Ž . Ž . Ž .1986 and Lucas 1988 and smaller than that of Stock and Watson 1993 .
Ž .Based on the work of Basu and Fernald 1994, 1995 , Basu and Kimball
Ž . Ž .1997 , and Basu 1996 , we chose 0.9, which implies a markup of 11 percent
and an elasticity of demand of 10.
We set the parameters  , 	 ,  , and  using balanced growth path relation-
Žships in our model and various statistics in the data. Again, the parameter
.values are given in Table I. With these parameters, our model predicts an
annualized capital-output ratio of 2.65, an investment-output ratio of 0.23, and a
share of time allocated to the market of 13. The capital-output ratio and the
Ž .investment-output ratio are the same as those calculated by Christiano 1988 ,
and the time allocated to the market is similar to that of Cooley and Prescott
Ž .1995 . In using the national income accounts to determine the capital share in
our model, we assumed that monopoly profits are allocated proportionately to
capital and labor. With this assumption, the capital share of income in our
Ž .model is 13, which is similar to that estimated by Christiano 1988 .
Ž . Ž . 2We chose an adjustment cost function of the form  xk b xk 	 2,
where b	0. We set the adjustment cost parameter b so that the Hodrick-Pre-
scott-filtered data from the model produce a standard deviation of investment
relative to that of output similar to the corresponding statistic for the U.S.
Ž .economy 3.25 . We set b0 when the relative volatility of investment in the
economy with no adjustment costs is too small.
The stochastic process for the growth rate of the money stock is given by
log   log   , where  is an independent and identically normallyt t1 t
distributed mean-zero shock. The serial correlation parameter for money growth
rates, , was calculated using Citibase’s quarterly data on M1 from 1959:3
through 1995:2. We obtained 0.57.
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In our experiments, we will vary the amount of staggering, N, as well as the
length of time of exogenous price stickiness, which we denote by T. When we
vary these, we also adjust the discount factor  , the depreciation rate 	 , and the
serial correlation parameter  so as to keep the capital-output and investment-
output ratios and the quarterly serial correlation unchanged. Specifically, we set
0.97TN, 	10.92TN, and 0.574TN, where T is measured in years.
For most of the experiments, we set T equal to one-quarter of one year and
N13, so that prices are fixed for one quarter at a time, a cohort of producers
chooses prices every week, and consumers make their decisions weekly.
Our notion of a contract multiplier is designed to measure how much
staggered price-setting increases the persistence of output relative to synchro-
nized price-setting. We measure the persistence of output by its half-life, defined
as the length of time after a shock before the deviation in output shrinks to half
of its impact value. With synchronized price-setting, on average the half-life of
output is one-half the length of exogenous stickiness. The reason is that
monetary shocks occur randomly between price adjustments, and the associated
movements in output last only until the next price adjustment. Thus, we define
the contract multiplier in a model with staggered price-setting as the ratio of the
half-life of output to one-half the length of exogenous stickiness. Hence, a
multiplier of, say, 5 means that staggered price-setting generates output move-
ments that last 5 times longer than they would with synchronized price-setting.
An attractive feature of the contract multiplier is that in our quantitative
models, this multiplier is approximately invariant to the length of exogenous
price stickiness.
We measured the half-life of output in the data by fitting an ARMA process
to the logarithm of real GDP, after removing a quadratic trend. The fitted
equation is
log y  1.30 log y  0.38 log y  ,t t1 t2 t
Ž . Ž .0.066 0.066
where the numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The Ljung-Box Q test
Žindicates little evidence for serial correlation of the residuals Q13.8 with
.significance level 0.46 . From this equation, we calculated the half-life of output
1to be 10 quarters, or 2 years. This measure is admittedly imperfect, but2
provides a useful benchmark.
For the bulk of our analysis, we consider economies with a period of
exogenous price stickiness of 1 quarter. The contract multiplier needed to match
this measure of persistence is 20. With one month of exogenous price stickiness,
the needed contract multiplier is 60; with one year, 5.
5. RESULTS FOR THE BENCHMARK ECONOMY
The main question we address here is whether staggered price-setting can
lead to persistent movements in output. We begin by considering a stripped-down
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version of the benchmark model that we can solve analytically for the equilib-
rium. In this version, we abstract from capital and impose a static money
demand equation. We show that in order to get persistence, the equilibrium
wage rate must change little when consumption changes. We show that for the
class of preferences in our benchmark model, the equilibrium wage changes so
much that we cannot get persistence.
Ž .Consider a version of the benchmark model without capital 0 and with
Ž .two cohorts of monopolists staggering their price-setting N2 . Suppose that
Ž .the utility function is given by equation 24 , as in the benchmark economy. We
log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around a deterministic steady state with
a constant money supply. Let x , x , p , w , c , y , and m represent theˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆi t t t t t t t
t1 t1 t tŽ . Ž . Ž . Ž .logarithmic deviations from a steady-state for P i, s , P s , P s , w s ,
Ž t. Ž t. Ž t.c s , y s , and M s , respectively.
Now, simply impose a static money demand equation in which consumption
t t t tŽ . Ž . Ž . Ž .equals real balances, so M s P s c s y s and hence
Ž .26 m p y .ˆ ˆ ˆt t t
Ž . Ž .Next, consider the pricing equation 8 . Substituting for Q from equation 16 ,
setting 1, and linearizing the resulting equation around the deterministic
steady state gives
1 1 1Ž . Ž .27 x  E p  E p  E w w ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆi t t1 t t1 t1 t1 t t12 2 2
where E denotes the expectation as of period t1. The price level p is aˆt1 t
weighted average of the individual prices:
x xˆ ˆt t1Ž .28 p   .tˆ 2 2
Ž . Ž .Substituting 28 into 27 and imposing equilibrium gives
1 1Ž . Ž .29 x  x  E x E w w .ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆt t1 t1 t1 t1 t t12 2
Ž . Ž .Next, note that with 0 and N2, using 22 , 20 can be written as
1Ž . Ž . 1  11 1t t t1 t2Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .y s  l s P s  P s2 2
1Ž . Ž .1 1 1 11 1t1 t2Ž . Ž . P s  P s .2 2
Log-linearizing this equation around a deterministic steady state gives
ˆŽ .30 y  l .tˆ t
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Ž .Log-linearizing the labor supply equation 13 around the deterministic steady
state gives
U Ul l
 log   log ž / ž /U Uc css ssŽ . Ž .31 w  c  m pˆ ˆ ˆ ˆt t t t log c  log MP
Ul
 log ž /Uc ss ˆ l ,t log l
where the subscript ss denotes that the derivatives are evaluated at the steady
Ž .state allocations. With our functional forms 31 becomes
1 1 1  ˆŽ . Ž . Ž .32 w    c  1 m p  l ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆt t t t tž / ž /   
where we have used the facts that the steady state allocations satisfy c  l s s s s
Ž .MP ands s
U  cl ss  w  .s sŽ .U  1cc ssss
Ž . Ž . Ž .Substituting 26 , 30 , and c y in 32 gives the following log-linearized laborˆ ˆt t
supply equation:
Ž .33 w  y ,ˆ ˆt t
where

Ž .34 1 .

Here  is the elasticity of the equilibrium real wage rate with respect to
Ž . Ž .consumption. Substituting 33 into 29 gives
1 1Ž . Ž .35 x  x  E x E y y .ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆt t1 t1 t1 t1 t t12 2
Ž . Ž . Ž .The system of equations 26 , 28 , and 35 is the same as that in Taylor
Ž .1980 . The only difference between our price-setting equation and Taylor’s is
that our value of  depends on the underlying preferences and technology while
Taylor’s  is a structural parameter.
Ž . Ž . Ž .The system of equations 26 , 28 , and 35 can be solved to determine how
many shocks are divided into movements in prices and movements in output.
Ž .Equation 26 implies that large movements in output require small movements
Ž .in the price level. But equation 35 implies that large movements in output have
small effects on the price level only if  is small.
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To see how  influences the division of money shocks into price and output
Ž .movements, we solve the model for x , p , and y . Substituting for y in 35ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆt t t t
Ž . Ž .using 26 and 28 , we obtain
1 2
Ž .E x 2 x x  E m m .ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆt1 t1 t t1 t1 t t11 1
We can use standard methods to write x astˆ
2a
iŽ . Ž .36 x ax  E a m m ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆÝt t1 t1 ti t1i1 i0
where a is the root with absolute value less than 1 which solves a2a10,
Ž . Ž .where 2 1  1 . This root is equal to
'1 
Ž .37 a .'1 
Ž .Now suppose that m is a random walk. After simplifying 36 , we can writeˆ t
Ž . Ž .38 x ax  1a m .ˆ ˆ ˆt t1 t1
Ž . Ž .Using 28 to substitute for x in 38 , we obtaintˆ
Ž . Ž .Ž .39 p ap  1a m m 2.ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆt t1 t1 t2
Ž . Ž .Finally, using 26 to substitute for p in 39 , we obtaintˆ
Ž . Ž . Ž .Ž .40 y ay  m m  1a m m 2.ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆt t1 t t1 t1 t2
Ž .As should be clear from 40 , the persistence properties of output with respect
to money shocks depend critically on the value of a and, therefore, on the value
Ž . Ž .of  . Recall from 34 that 1. Hence it follows from 37 that a0, so
output is not persistent.
Ž . Ž .When  is treated as a free parameter, Taylor’s model described by 26 , 28 ,
Ž .and 35 can produce the needed contract multiplier. When N2, one-half of
the length of exogenous price stickiness is 1. Thus, in order to get a multiplier of
20, we need a half-life of 20. If a0, it is easy to show that the half-life of
Ž .output is given by t1 log 1a log a. For a multiplier of 20, we need
a0.965 and hence 0.00031. In our model,  is not a free parameter and is
necessarily greater than 1.
In Table II we report values of the contract multiplier for a variety of
economies that use our calibrated parameters, except where noted.3 We investi-
3 To calculate the contract multiplier for our economies in which output is measured at discrete
intervals, we need a measure of the half-life of output for such economies. We calculate the half-life
by finding the first date at which output is lower than half its impact value and then linearly
interpolate output between this date and the previous date.
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gate how the intertemporal links of interest-sensitive money demand and capital
accumulation affect the contract multiplier separately and jointly. The first
column of the table refers to economies without capital and with interest-insen-
sitive money demand, while the next three columns refer to economies with only
interest-sensitive money demand, with only capital, and with both interest-sensi-
tive money demand and capital, respectively. We report multipliers for economies
with 2 cohorts and i.i.d. money growth since these are comparable to results for
the stripped-down version of our model. We also report multipliers for economies
with 13 cohorts and serially correlated money growth and think of these
multipliers as more relevant for comparing with data.
In Table II we see that for all versions of our benchmark model, the contract
multiplier is roughly 1. With this contract multiplier, in order to generate the
half-life of output seen in the data, the exogenous length of price stickiness
would have to be 5 years.
Ž . Ž .Taylor 1980 and Blanchard 1991 conjecture that, if the length of time that
prices are fixed is held constant, then increasing the amount of staggering
increases the persistence of output fluctuations. We investigate this conjecture
by considering versions of our benchmark economy with N2, 13, and 26. The
resulting multipliers are 1.06, 0.99, and 0.87. These results show that increasing
the amount of staggering does not increase the persistence of output responses.
We also examine whether the contract multiplier varies with the length of
exogenous price stickiness, and we find that it does not. For example, for our
TABLE II
THE CONTRACT MULTIPLIER WITH VARIOUS INTERTEMPORAL LINKS
Types of Intertemporal Links
aEconomy None Only Money Only Capital Both
Benchmark
2 cohorts, iid money growth 0.90 0.90 1.02 1.05
13 cohorts, serially correlated money growth 1.01 0.87 1.11 0.99
bNear-Perfect Substitute Preferences
2 cohorts, iid money growth 21.97 20.00 1.07 0.50
13 cohorts, serially correlated money growth 139.10 22.72 8.31 0.13
Convex Demand
2 cohorts, iid money growth 2.17 2.17 1.57 1.62
13 cohorts, serially correlated money growth 3.79 2.44 1.76 1.55
Specific Factors
2 cohorts, iid money growth 1.43 1.43 1.30 1.30
13 cohorts, serially correlated money growth 1.82 1.54 1.59 1.33
Combined Model
2 cohorts, iid money growth 1.96 1.96 1.75 1.75
13 cohorts, serially correlated money growth 3.26 2.19 2.39 1.81
a See Table I for parameter values. No capital link implies that the capital share is 0. No money link implies that the
interest elasticity of money is 0. If money growth is serially correlated, then  0.57113; otherwise, it is 0.
b If there is no money link, we assume that MP c.
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benchmark economy, changing the length of price stickiness from one quarter to
one year does not change the contract multiplier.
6. ROBUSTNESS
In our benchmark economy, the contract multiplier is extremely small be-
cause prices are extremely sensitive to movements in marginal costs. These
results suggest that to generate a large contract multiplier, we must find some
mechanism that makes prices insensitive to movements in marginal costs. We
consider three such mechanisms in what follows. Then, we examine how the
contract multiplier changes in the various models as we vary parameters, and we
explore how combining the various mechanisms changes the multiplier.
6.1. Near-Perfect Substitute Preferences
First, we consider a specification of preferences in which consumption and
leisure are near-perfect substitutes. With these preferences,  is small, so that
prices are insensitive to movements in marginal costs. Intuition suggests that
these preferences should generate a large contract multiplier. We find that
without the intertemporal links of capital accumulation and interest-sensitive
money demand, they do. Once we add intertemporal links, however, the contract
multiplier is small.
To see how the substitutability of consumption and leisure is related to  ,
consider the following measure. Let  denote the equilibrium elasticity ofe
substitution between leisure and consumption in a steady state with c  l s s s s
Ž .MP defined bys s
1 l
 log ž /c ss
  .e Ul
 log ž /Uc ss
This elasticity measures the percentage change in the equilibrium ratio of
leisure to consumption induced by a percentage change in the equilibrium wage
rate. In equilibrium, the wage rate equals the marginal rate of substitution
between leisure and consumption, consumption equals labor input, and, with
 Žstatic money demand, cMP. It is straightforward to show that  1  1e
.c . Clearly, for  to be small,  must be large.e
This argument leads us to consider utility functions of the form:
111 1 Ž .c l MP
Ž . Ž . Ž .41 U c, l , MP    1 .1 21 1 1
For such utility functions, if  and  are small, so that the utility function is
close to linear in both consumption and leisure, then  is large. Log-linearizinge
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Ž .the labor supply equation 13 gives  , where 1 is the labor supply
elasticity evaluated at the steady state. With these preferences, we can get a
large contract multiplier as long as  and  are small enough. For example, a 
of 0.0002 and a labor supply elasticity of 9,091 yield 0.00031 and a contract
multiplier of 20. These calculations suggest that preferences with high substi-
tutability between consumption and leisure offer one route to persistence.
Ž Ž . Ž .Blanchard and Fischer 1989 and Blanchard 1990 point to the importance of
high labor supply elasticities in generating persistence. Our calculations suggest
.that near quasi-linearity in consumption is also crucial.
To set the parameter  , we use the money demand equation for this economy:
M  1 R1
Ž .42 log constant log c log ,
  RP
where R is the gross nominal interest rate. This money demand equation makes
clear that once  is given, we cannot vary the interest elasticity of money
demand without also varying the elasticity of consumption. Therefore, when we
eliminate the intertemporal link of interest-sensitive money demand, we replace
the money demand equation with a static money demand equation of the form
MPc. When we allow intertemporal links, we set  , so that the con-
Ž .sumption elasticity of money demand is 1 as balanced growth dictates .
The results for this model show that intertemporal links can have a dramatic
Ž .effect on the contract multiplier. See Table II. With N2, no persistence in
money growth, and no intertemporal links, the multiplier is 21.97. The same
economy with intertemporal links has a multiplier of only 0.50. The results also
show that the key intertemporal link that affects the multiplier is capital
accumulation. For the economy with N13 and persistent money growth, the
reduction in the multiplier is even more dramatic. Eliminating intertemporal
links makes developing analytical solutions easy; that step is, therefore, usually
thought of as a useful shortcut. The results here show that this shortcut can be
misleading.
For this economy, the impulse responses following a one-time money shock
are as follows. Output and consumption rise by a large amount in the impact
period and by a much smaller amount thereafter. The contract multiplier is
small because money shocks lead to an investment boom in the impact period,
which raises the demand for labor and, therefore, wage rates. Since utility is
nearly linear in both consumption and labor, the rise in wage rates leads to a
large increase in both consumption and labor in the impact period relative to
future periods. This makes both the half-life of output and the multiplier small.
Adding adjustment costs would increase the contract multiplier, but would
also raise problems. With N13, persistent money growth, and both intertem-
poral links, the volatility of investment relative to output is 0.42, which is
substantially less than the corresponding statistic in the data. Adding adjustment
costs to investment will decrease this relative volatility even further, making this
a poorer business cycle model along this important dimension. Experiments with
STICKY PRICE MODELS 1169
a large range of adjustment costs do not change the multiplier much: they
reduce the size of the output response in the impact period but also in
subsequent periods.
The results for this model also emphasize the role of interest-elastic money
demand. In models with a static money demand equation of the form mpy,ˆ ˆ ˆ
the contract multiplier clearly is large if and only if the price level responds
slowly over time. In our near-perfect substitutes model, money demand is
interest elastic. It turns out that although the price level responds slowly, output
is not affected very much, and the contract multiplier is tiny. The reason is that
interest rates fall enough so that households willingly demand higher real
balances, even though output has not risen much.
One problem with extreme substitutability between consumption and leisure
is that these preferences have troublesome implications for the behavior of
labor supply with even modest growth in wage rates and consumption. Suppose,
for example, that wage rates and consumption grow 2 percent per year. Then,
with our parameter values, labor input rises 57 percent each day.
6.2. Conex Demand
Ž .Now we explore an avenue suggested by Kimball 1995 , designed to make
prices less sensitive to marginal costs, which should tend to increase the size of
the multiplier. To motivate Kimball’s idea, note that the log-linearized pricing
Ž . Žequation 29 implies that a 1 percent increase in marginal costs which are
.simply wage rates in our model without capital results in a 1 percent increase in
prices set by the current cohort of intermediate goods producers. The intuition
for this feature is as follows. In static models, a monopolist’s markup of price
over marginal cost is a simple function of the elasticity of demand. With
constant elasticity of demand, the markup is constant, so that when costs rise 1
percent, so do prices.
Ž .Kimball 1995 suggests an alternative formulation of the final goods produc-
tion technology that results in demand functions with the following feature: as
prices rise, the elasticity of demand increases, so that the demand curve is
convex. Demand functions of this kind can make the markup decline as prices
rise, thus implying that a 1 percent increase in marginal costs results in a less
than 1 percent increase in prices. Thus, after a monetary shock, each cohort of
firms does not raise prices much, so that output deviates from its steady state for
a long time.
We begin by analyzing this alternative formulation in a version of our model
without capital and with N2. This alternative formulation closely follows
Ž .Kimball’s 1995 work. Let the technology for producing final goods be implicitly
Ž .defined by Hg yy di1, where y is the use of the intermediate good i and yi i
is the output of the final good. Profit maximization by final goods producers,
 Ž . Ž .Ž .together with zero profits, implies that PPg yy Hg yy yy di. Thisi i i i
condition can be inverted to yield the demand function confronting each
d ŽŽ . Ž .Ž . .intermediate goods producer: y yd PP Hg yy yy di , where di i i i
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Ž .1 Ž .g . Substituting this demand function into the maximization problem 6 , we
can solve for the optimal price for intermediate goods producer i. Log-lineariz-
ing the resulting optimal pricing equation yields
1 1 Ž . Ž .43 x  E p  E p  E w w ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆi t t1 t t1 t1 t1 t t12 2 2
where again prices are written in log-deviation form. The parameter  is given
by
Ž .1 1
Ž .44  ,Ž .2 
Žwhere  is the elasticity of demand evaluated at the steady state that is,
Ž Ž .. Ž ..d g 1 g 1 and  is the parameter governing the curvature of the
Ž Ž Ž .. Ž . Ž Ž ... demand function that is, d g 1 g 1 d g 1 . Substituting w  1ˆt
 Ž . Ž . y and 28 into 43 , we obtaintˆ
1 1Ž . Ž .45 x  x  E x E y y ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆt t1 t1 t1 t1 t t12 2
  Ž . Ž .where  1 . Note that 45 has the same form as 35 but a different
value for  . The analysis above demonstrates that lower values of  lead to
more persistent output movements. The parameter  is determined by the
Ž .values of  and  . From equation 44 , we can see that if the demand function
is sufficiently convex, so that  is sufficiently negative, then , and hence  , can
be made arbitrarily small and output can be made arbitrarily persistent. Note
also that increases in  , with  held fixed, reduce . We show later that this
relation is important.
The key question now is, what values of  imply substantial persistence of
Ž .output? Kimball 1995 chooses a parameterization in which a 1 percent in-
crease in market share, yy, leads to a decline in the elasticity of demand fromi
11 to 8. In our model, the elasticity of demand in the steady state is 10, so we
choose a parameterization in which a 1 percent increase in market share, yy,i
leads to a decline in the elasticity of demand from 10 to 7. We use a Taylor
series expansion of the elasticity of demand around the steady state to calculate
the value of the curvature parameter associated with Kimball’s parameteriza-
Ž . Ž Ž .. ŽŽ .tion. The elasticity of demand is given by  yy d g yy g yy i i i
Ž ..   Ž .yy . Since g 1d , we can see that the Taylor series expansion of  yyi i
Ž . Ž .  Ž . Ž .around yy1 is given by  yy  1  1 1  yy1 . Usingi i i
Kimball’s parameterization, we obtain a value of 289. This value implies
that 0.029, and with our other parameters, the resulting value of  is 0.045.
This value implies a contract multiplier of 2.2.
Unfortunately, however, this parameterization implies that the demand func-
tion must be extraordinarily convex. To appreciate how convex this demand
function must be, consider a second-order Taylor series expansion of the
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demand function at the steady state, given by
2Ž .P P  1  Pi i iŽ . Ž . Ž .46 d g 1 1 1 1  1 .ž / ž / ž /2P P P
Using the parameterization that gives a multiplier of 2.2, we see that this
demand function implies that a 2 percent increase in relative prices results in a
78 percent reduction in demand, and a 2.3 percent increase in relative prices
results in zero demand. A demand function with this extreme level of convexity
is clearly inconsistent with both casual empiricism and a wide variety of demand
studies for a wide range of products.
ŽThe contract multiplier is smaller in the presence of intertemporal links. See
.Table II. When N13 and money growth is persistent, the multiplier is 3.79
without intertemporal links and only 1.55 with such links. The intuition for these
results is similar to that in the near-perfect substitutes model.
6.3. Specific Factors
Now we assume that each intermediate good is produced using a specific
factor in addition to labor and capital. Each of these specific factors is inelasti-
cally supplied. The motivation for including these specificities, is, of course, to
see if they lead to greater persistence in output. As our discussion of the
benchmark model makes clear, a key factor determining persistence in models
without intertemporal links is the sensitivity of the monopolist’s price to changes
in economy-wide output. With specific factors, this sensitivity is affected by two
forcesthe output effect and the wage effect. Increases in economy-wide output
induce increases in the monopolist’s output and raise the monopolists costs
because of decreasing returns to scale. This increase in costs induces the
monopolist to raise the price. Alone, the output effect makes prices more
sensitive to changes in output. Increases in wage rates induce a smaller increase
in the monopolist’s price with decreasing returns to scale. Alone, the wage effect
makes prices less sensitive to changes in output. The wage effect is stronger the
more elastic is demand. When demand is sufficiently elastic, the wage effect
dominates, the monopolist’s price is relatively insensitive to aggregate output,
and monetary shocks have more persistent effects.
We begin by analyzing a version of this model without intertemporal links.
Ž t.The production function for producing intermediate goods is given by y i, s 
Ž t.1l i, s . One interpretation of this production function is that it is a constant
returns to scale production function in labor and a specific factor, such as land.
Ž .The price-setting equation for the monopolist is given by the analog of 27 :
Ž .1 1 1 E w wˆ ˆt1 t t1Ž .47 x  E p  E p ˆ ˆ ˆi t t1 t t1 t12 2 2 1A
Ž .A E y yˆ ˆt1 t t1 ,
2 1A
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Ž . Ž .where A 1 and 1 1 , which is the elasticity of demand.
Ž . Ž .Comparing 47 to 27 , we see that with decreasing returns to scale, two
Ž . Ž .changes have occurred. Relative to 27 , 47 has an extra term. This extra term,
Ž .the last one in 47 , is the output effect discussed above and reflects the increase
in marginal costs associated with an increase in output. The response of the
Ž .price to the wage rate is reduced by 1 1A and is the wage effect discussed
Ž .above. With constant returns to scale A0 , this price-setting equation does
not depend on the elasticity of demand or directly on aggregate output. With
decreasing returns to scale, the larger is the demand elasticity, the less sensitive
is the best response to wage rates and economy-wide output. Substituting
  Ž . Ž .w  1 y and 28 into 47 and imposing equilibrium gives an equationˆ ˆt t
Ž .of the form in 35 with
1A
Ž .48  .
1A
For the parameters given in Table Inamely, 0.9, 10, 1.5, and
0.94and with A32, we get 0.19. This value of  yields a contract
multiplier of only 1.35. If, however, the elasticity of demand is large enough,
then  can be made arbitrarily close to 0 and the contract multiplier can be
made arbitrarily large. For example, we can generate a contract multiplier of 20
Ž .with an elasticity of demand of 6500 0.9998 .
While high enough demand elasticities can lead to substantial persistence,
they also lead to extremely counterfactual implications regarding the distribu-
tion of output across firms in our economy. To see this, note that relative
Ž t. Ž t.  Ž t. Ž t.outputs of monopolists i and j are given by y i, s y j, s  P j, s P i, s .
For example, with 6500, a 1 percent difference in relative prices implies a
30 Ž 6500.difference in relative outputs equal to 1.210 percent 1.01 .
Introducing intertemporal links into this model also reduces the size of the
contract multiplier. Assume that the technology for producing each intermediate
Ž Ž t. Ž t.. Ž t.1 Ž t.2good i is given by F k i, s , l i, s k i, s l i, s , where   1. The1 2
results in Table II show how the multiplier changes once we include capital and
interest-sensitive money demand. For the specific factors economy, we set
 49, and when capital is included, we set  29. We also assume that2 1
adjustment costs to capital are set so that the relative volatility of investment to
output is similar to that in the data. Without capital or interest-sensitive money
demand links, the multiplier is 1.82 with N13 and 0.57113. Introducing
capital and interest-sensitive money demand reduces this multiplier to 1.33,
which is not much higher than the multiplier’s value in our benchmark economy.
6.4. Sensitiity Analysis
Finally, we examine how the contract multiplier changes in the various models
as we vary parameters, both one at a time and simultaneously. We also consider
how combining the various models we have explored changes the multiplier.
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Ž Ž .Here we focus on key parameters. In Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 1998 , we
.report on how the multiplier varies with all of the parameters. We find that the
value of the multiplier is roughly 2 and that combining the various models does
not raise the multiplier much.
We begin with the benchmark economy. In Figure 1 we show how the
multiplier varies as we vary one parameter at a time for that economy, holding
fixed the relative volatility of investment to output. The other parameters for
this economy, with the exception of the adjustment cost parameter, are set at
their calibrated values given in Table I. In Figure 1, panels A and B illustrate
the roles of the intertemporal links. Panel A shows that the multiplier is roughly
constant in the interest elasticity of money demand and that the multiplier rises
only when the interest elasticity is less than 0.05. Panel B shows that the
multiplier does not change much as the capital share varies.
Panel C in Figure 1 shows that making the utility function more concave than
Ž .log increasing the risk aversion parameter  above 1 reduces the multiplier.
The contract multiplier varies with the risk aversion parameter because in all
our experiments we chose the adjustment cost parameter to produce the
volatility of investment relative to output in the data. As the utility function gets
more concave, the volatility of investment falls without adjustment costs. To
keep the volatility of investment constant, we must reduce adjustment costs as
we raise risk aversion. But lowering adjustment costs reduces the contract
multiplier. When the risk aversion parameter is above 2.2, adjustment costs are
not needed and the contract multiplier is small.
Panel D in Figure 1 illustrates that the contract multiplier increases as the
Ž Ž ..demand elasticity  1 1 increases. The intuition for this finding is
similar to that in the specific factors economy. Since capital does not move
much, it acts like a factor in fixed supply.
We also experiment by varying some key parameters simultaneously within
the ranges reported in Table III. We set the discount factor  , the depreciation
Žrate 	 , and the share parameter in utility  at their calibrated values. See
.Table I. Our ranges for the interest elasticity , the capital share  , risk
aversion  , and the weight on leisure  are chosen to include most of the
estimates provided in the literature. We choose  so that money growth ranges
from independent and identically distributed to very persistent. We choose the
elasticity of demand  to range from fairly inelastic to an upper bound dictated
by computational feasibility. Within these parameter ranges, the largest value of
the multiplier we find is 3.05. This occurs with an interest elasticity of 0.2, a
Žcapital share of 0.22, a weight of 9 on leisure in utility, risk aversion of 1 that is,
.log utility , a demand elasticity of 300, and a serial correlation of 0.96 on money
growth.
In panel A of Figure 2, we show how the multiplier varies as we vary the
demand curvature parameter  for the convex demand economy, holding fixed
the relative volatility of investment. The other parameters for this economy, with
the exception of the adjustment cost parameter, are set at their calibrated
Ž .values. See Table I. The inset to the figure shows that the contract multiplier is
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TABLE III
PARAMETER RANGES AND THE RESULTS OF SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Economy Parameters Values
Ž .  Benchmark Interest Elasticity  0.2, 0.5
Ž .  Capital Share  0.22, 0.44
Ž .  Weight on Leisure in Utility  0.11, 9
Ž .  Risk Aversion  1, 10
Ž .  Demand Elasticity  5, 300
Ž .  Serial Correlation of Money Growth  0, 0.99
Maximum Multiplier 3.05
Ž0.2, 0.22, 9,
.1, 300, 0.96
Ž .  Convex Demand Demand Curvature  289, 11
Maximum Multiplier 3.20
Ž0.2, 0.22, 9,
.1, 5, 0.96, 289
Ž .  Specific Factors Capital Share  0.22, 0.441
Ž .  Labor Share  0.33, 0.782
Maximum Multiplier 4.17
Ž0.2, 9, 1, 300,
.0.96,  0.22,  0.331 2
1.8 with a demand curvature of 578which is twice as large as that used by
Ž .Kimball 1995 . But even if we set the curvature parameter 100 times higher at
57,800, we do not get a contract multiplier above 5. Furthermore, with
Ž .this curvature parameter, equation 46 implies that a 0.5 percent increase in
relative prices results in zero demand. Even with such an extremely convex
demand function, when we raise  from 1 to 2.2, the contract multiplier falls
from a value above 4 to a value close to 0. Again, this fall in the contract
multiplier is due to the decrease in the adjustment cost parameter when  is
raised. The empirical asset pricing literature suggests a risk aversion parameter
significantly above 1, so that even this level of convexity of demand may not be
enough to generate the requisite persistence. When we vary the parameters
simultaneously within the ranges reported in Table III, we find that the largest
value of the multiplier is 3.20.
In panel B of Figure 2, we show how the multiplier varies as we vary the
extent of decreasing returns to scale in the specific factors economy. We do so
Ž .by varying the share of total income going to the fixed factor 1  .1 2
When varying this share, we keep   equal to 2 and vary  and  . When2 1 1 2
we do this, we see that the contract multiplier does not change much. When we
vary the parameters simultaneously in the range reported in Table III, we find
that the largest value of the multiplier is 4.17.
Finally, we consider a model in which we incorporate near-perfect substitutes,
convex demand, and specific factors in order to look for significant interaction
effects. In Table II we report the results for this combined model at our
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calibrated values. The last column of Table II shows that combining these
Ž .features raises the multiplier modestly to 1.81 from 1.55 convex demand only
Ž .and 1.33 specific factors only . When we vary the parameters simultaneously in
the ranges reported in Table III, the maximum value of the contract multiplier
is 4.17 and occurs with the same extreme parameter settings as the maximum of
the specific factors economy.
One way to understand this is to note that any model with near-perfect
substitutes gives a tiny contract multiplier. Thus, the only possible interesting
interactions are between the convex demand and specific factors specifications.
Panels C and D of Figure 2 show that the convex demand specification gives a
large multiplier when the demand elasticity is small, while the specific factors
specification gives a large multiplier when the demand elasticity is large. So
when we combine the two features, we can either choose to make the elasticity
small and get essentially the same multiplier as with convex demand alone or
choose to make the elasticity large and get essentially the same multiplier as
with specific factors alone. In no sense do these three variations tend to
reinforce each other, and in no sense is the multiplier for the model with all
three variations the sum of the multipliers for each one separately.
7. CONCLUSION
The central challenge to a theory of monetary business cycles is to find a
solution to the persistence problem. Monetary economists have long searched
for a mechanism that has a multiplier effect in the sense that small frictions lead
to long periods of endogenous price rigidity and, hence, persistent output
movements. Here we find that the staggered price-setting mechanism is not the
long-sought solution.
One interpretation of our findings is that if 5 years of exogenous price
stickiness is plausible, then conventional models used in the business cycle
literature can generate persistent output fluctuations. With the amount of
Ž .convexity in demand posited by Kimball 1995 , or with extremely elastic
demand and sizable departures from constant returns to scale, generating
1persistence requires 2 years of exogenous price stickiness. If one quarter of2
exogenous price stickiness is plausible, then generating persistence requires
extraordinarily convex demand or extremely elastic demand.
Altogether, these findings suggest that mechanisms to solve the persistence
problem must be found elsewhere.
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